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A Better Method for Analyzing
the Costs and Benefits of
Fundraising at Universities
Patrick Michael Rooney
This article develops a new methodology for a more compre-
hensive and useful analysis of the costs and benefits of fundrais-
ing, as well as the total costs and net benefits associated with
development efforts in general. This approach does a better job
of linking the timing of return of fundraising efforts and mea-
suring the actual return on investments in fundraising (as
opposed to the reported return) than the widely used guidelines
from the Council for Advancement and Support of Education
and the National Association of College and University Busi-
ness Officers (CASE/NACUBO) (1990). The implications are
a better methodology for practitioners that they can use to
enhance internal decision making and a better methodology for
boards to use in evaluating performance and accountability.
Recently, other large, public universities have begun using sev-
eral of these concepts in the assessment of their development
offices (Rooney, 1998).
Doing this work [monitoring costs and benefits] is necessary
and required; disclosing the results is laudable and brave.
Take courage pills; the results will be praiseworthy and more
than worth the effort.
—James Greenfield, 1996 (p. xv)
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THIS article proposes a new methodology for evaluating the effi-cacy and efficiency of fundraising efforts at universities. Itdoes so by trying to include all of the relevant costs and ben-
efits and to exclude those that are largely irrelevant—despite the his-
torical precedent for including them. Moreover, it tries to more
closely link the time periods of development expenditures and
receipt of private gifts. If followed, this approach will add a level of
relevance that will enable decision makers to more accurately track
both the actual benefits of development efforts and the concomitant
costs. As a result, university administrators should be better able to
determine whether or not those efforts should be expanded or cur-
tailed and whether or not the efforts are more or less costly than
those of their peers.
For example, by more accurately measuring the costs and ben-
efits of development efforts, university administrators will have a
much better understanding of the true net benefits accruing from
various fundraising strategies and from the development effort over-
all. This will facilitate the decision as to whether or not to pursue a
given strategy and will provide a better estimate of the gross revenues
necessary in order to achieve the goals of a fundraising effort. In
addition, the administration will be able to compare the results of
the development office with other peer or benchmark programs and
more accurately gauge the effectiveness of the development program
with respect to fundraising than it is currently able to with the stan-
dard protocols delineated in CASE/NACUBO (1990). This new
methodology will still allow for direct comparisons with other uni-
versities that use the CASE/NACUBO guidelines and with other
fundraising organizations’ development efforts.
Warren Heeman (1979) and other scholars argue that there is a
distinction between fundraising efficiency (for example, minimizing
the average cost per dollar raised) and effectiveness (for example,
maximizing the net between total gifts less total fundraising costs).
Heeman illustrates his point with an example. Most would prefer a
program that raised $3 million and spent $300,000 (cost of fundrais-
ing equals 10 percent) over a program that raised $2 million and
spent only $160,000 (8 percent cost of fundraising). The former
would have increased the net resources available for mission
enhancement by $860,000 more than the latter campaign—despite
the higher cost-benefit ratio of the larger campaign.
Richard Steinberg (1994) defines the economic concept of opti-
mal fundraising efforts as the level of expenditure such that marginal
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costs equal marginal benefits. In other words, the development
program should continue to invest more resources into fundraising
efforts up to the point where it costs one dollar to raise one dollar.
This approach will yield the maximum total net resources available
to the organization. Steinberg also discusses other maximizing strate-
gies (for example, budget maximizers and service maximizers, sub-
ject to “acceptable” fundraising techniques) but goes on to say,
“[cost-benefit] ratios do not matter” (p. 14). When evaluating a
development program, the average cost per dollar received (or cost-
benefit ratio), rather than the marginal costs, remains an important
evaluative tool because the marginal costs and the marginal benefits
are much more difficult to identify or to compare with other
fundraising efforts.
Furthermore, many donors and board members continue to be
concerned about accountability and best practices and are likely
to continue to compare the performance of the targeted development
program with other such efforts. Although it is not simply the case
that large costs of fundraising are inherently bad or “too high,” the
costs and benefits need to be evaluated in the proper context. For
example, as will be discussed later in more detail, Greenfield (1996)
argues that benchmarking should be done for each type of fundrais-
ing activity rather than a simple examination of total costs and total
benefits produced by the development office. Perhaps equally impor-
tant, it is necessary to evaluate the costs and benefits of the devel-
opment program in its context. That is, a high cost of fundraising
may be quite acceptable for newer, less developed, public universi-
ties but might be unacceptable for a long-standing private university
that has had a long history of donor relations and development suc-
cess. Other distinctions arise within colleges and universities and
many more would arise in comparisons among all organizations that
engage in fundraising.
Rooney (1999) discusses whether or not the distinction between
fundraising effectiveness and efficiency is real. Rooney demonstrates
that under most plausible circumstances, a fundraising effort that
maximizes net revenue will operate at the point that is both efficient
and effective as defined by Heeman. In exceptional cases, these oper-
ating points may not coincide, but they are not necessarily different.
Private Grants
CASE/NACUBO (1990) recommends that universities include pri-
vate (that is, nongovernmental) grants as a part of the benefits por-
tion of the cost-benefit analysis. For some campuses this issue may
be rather insignificant, but for many universities private grants
may be nearly equal to, or even greater than, the amount of private
gifts. For example, in the case study discussed in this article, private
grants are nearly three times as great as private gifts. The justifica-
tion for inclusion of the private grants is that they are part of the
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total voluntary support generated by the university. In some cases,
the development office may participate in securing some of the pri-
vate grants for the university. In these cases, it may be appropriate to
include those private grants that the development office helped
to attract as a benefit in the cost-benefit analyses—as long as the con-
comitant costs are also included.
However, from a campus decision-making perspective, private
grants are largely irrelevant to analyzing the costs and benefits of
fundraising for three main reasons. First, the grants are usually
the results of efforts by faculty and staff to obtain externally funded
research awards that have nothing to do with fundraising.
Second, there is no estimation in costs of fundraising studies of
the value of the time of faculty and staff in attracting, maintaining,
and (hopefully) renewing these grants. There is also no estimation
of the costs expended by the campus for the administration of these
grants. Even when universities have a good estimate of some portion
of the costs of securing these private grants (such as the costs of
a research and sponsored programs office), these costs are not
included in the cost side of the cost-benefit ratios commonly used by
development offices that follow CASE/NACUBO (1990). Robert
Teitelbaum (1979) suggests that accurate studies of fundraising costs
should include the costs of obtaining and administering these grants
but should exclude expenditures to implement the grants.
Third, if development offices want to include private grants as
part of their benefits, it would be both more useful from a manage-
ment decision-making perspective and more intellectually honest to
include them in a distinct cost-benefit analysis. This analysis would
allocate the pro rata time (compensation), the direct expenditures of
the development office devoted to these activities, and the pro rata
share of the development office’s indirect costs for these activities,
comparing these costs directly with the private grants received
through the development office’s efforts. Wesley Lindahl (1994)
agrees that research grants that are solicited directly, without assis-
tance from the development office, as well as other “low development
effort gifts,” should be excluded from the benefits component when
conducting fundraising cost-benefit analyses.
Time of the President and Deans
According to the CASE/NACUBO guidelines (1990), the develop-
ment efforts measured in this article do not include the pro rata share
of the compensation of the president, the chancellor, or any of the
academic deans devoted to development. However, the cost, or
opportunity cost, of university leaders’ time should be incorporated
into the cost-benefit analysis. While this cost would be difficult to
measure precisely, the pro rata share of compensation for the time
that academic leaders spend on fundraising would be a useful yard-
stick for measuring the opportunity cost of their time. Given the
detailed scheduling of these senior academic managers’ time, it would
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be quite possible to calculate an approximate percentage of their time
devoted to fundraising and related activities.
Frequently, it is the personal relationships of, and time devoted
by, the key leaders in the university that actualize potential gifts,
especially in the case of large gifts. The modern dean and president
spend a great deal of time (some would say an inordinate amount)
engaged in fundraising activities. If, however, the academic leaders
of the university did not need new resources to implement the mis-
sion of the university, presumably, their time could be better spent
on other activities. While fundraising has become an important ingre-
dient in the success of most universities and the perceived success of
their presidents, it is important (or at least should be) only to the
extent that it improves the net resource base for mission fulfillment.
It should not be viewed as an end in itself.
Costs for Alumni, Public, and
Constituent Relations
CASE/NACUBO (1990) also suggests that costs of fundraising should
not include the costs for alumni relations, public relations, or any
other constituent relations. They suggest that those costs are “con-
sidered as expenditures in support of fund-raising, rather than as
fund-raising costs” (p. 15). This may, in fact, be a way of obscuring
costs. For example, a development program could shift many of its
personnel and nonpersonnel expenditures to these other areas and,
thereby, artificially lower its cost-benefit ratio. Even if not done inten-
tionally to mislead, it should be clear that, holding everything else
constant, larger expenditures for alumni or public relations are likely
to be associated with larger gifts.
John Leslie (1979) points out that the quality of inputs affects
the fundraising outcomes, as does the quantity of inputs, such as
expenditures for institutional advancement, including public rela-
tions, alumni relations, and development. Perhaps it would be bet-
ter and more relevant to publish another set of ratios in order to
display the costs of fundraising both with and without these addi-
tional expenditures in support of fundraising. Although it would be
unfair to include all of the costs associated with alumni relations,
public relations, or any other constituent relations as true costs of
fundraising (because these offices also provide other services), it
might be useful to illustrate these costs in order to convey the total
effort devoted to institutional advancement and donor cultivation.
Asset Management and Administrative
Costs of the Development Office
Another important methodological change is to include the asset
management and administrative costs associated with a development
office. There would not be significant administrative and asset man-
agement costs in a development program if there were not fundraising
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costs and efforts. (However, even absent any fundraising efforts, there
may be voluntary gifts that would necessitate some administrative
and asset management costs.) Although these are not true fundrais-
ing costs, they are costs derived from fundraising efforts that are not
of direct benefit to mission fulfillment.
For those reluctant to consider these costs as relevant to fundrais-
ing, it must be emphasized that a campus engages in fundraising activ-
ities in order to generate additional, or “net new,” resources to facilitate
the campus’s ability to accomplish its mission. When evaluating the
costs and benefits of fundraising, one should look at all of the costs
associated with fundraising that absorb resources, which are then not
available to the campus for mission enhancement. The “full costs” of
development offices, therefore, include not only the costs of fundrais-
ing per se, but also the costs incurred by the campus to pay its share
of the development program’s administrative and asset management
costs. Perhaps the analysis could be better understood in the follow-
ing depiction:
Net new resources available for mission enhancement
 GIFTS  COSTS
where
GIFTS  Private gifts
COSTS  Fundraising costs  Asset management costs
 Endowment administration
 Costs in support of fundraising
This may be a stringent standard, but if we are unwilling to have
honest and meaningful standards, then we must ask whom we are
trying to fool and why.
It could be argued that the costs that are not directly related to
fundraising (for example, asset management, endowment adminis-
tration, and other costs “in support of fundraising”) should be eval-
uated in distinct but parallel analyses that cover the full costs (and
benefits) associated with development programs. For example, there
may be separate cost-benefit ratios that are specific to fundraising,
asset management, endowment administration, and private grants.
It might be best to display these costs as a percentage of annual pri-
vate gifts, as a percentage of the total endowment, or both, or by
other measures yet to be determined.
Space Utilization, Depreciation, Maintenance,
Utilities, and Similar Costs
It must be acknowledged that the use of “full costs” in the results
section of this article is somewhat of a misnomer as it does not
include any campus fees for space utilization, depreciation, main-
tenance, utilities, and so on, in the development offices that are
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distributed throughout the various units on campus. This may be a
shortcoming, but the campus has not developed a well-defined
model for accurately tracking these costs at the unit level (in the
School of Science, for example)—much less a subunit level (such
as in a shared office for development and alumni relations). (The
results section does include these costs for the main development
office as part of the administrative costs.) Excluding these costs is
the standard approach per CASE/NACUBO (1990). Teitelbaum
(1979), however, argues that such costs should be included or at
least approximated by using an average rental rate for office space
in the area. Similarly, Greenfield (1996) argues that the overhead
costs allocated across the fundraising benefits ought to include
administrative work, personnel supervision, office equipment, util-
ities, and depreciation.
Changes in Pledges and Changes
in Bequest Expectancies
In order to do a better job of linking the time when development
effort expenditures are made and the time when the benefits of the
resulting gifts are counted, it is necessary to modify the method-
ological approach to incorporate changes in pledges and changes in
bequest expectancies. Ignoring these changes overstates the costs
incurred in a given year and understates the benefits resulting from
those costs in a given year. Although the net effect is probably aver-
aged out in a year-to-year comparison (especially if one uses a three-
or five-year moving average) of institutional data for pledges (but not
necessarily for bequest expectancies), making these modifications
makes good accounting and economic sense. Bequests are more com-
plicated because of the very long time frames involved in cultivating
them. Large bequests further complicate cost-benefit analyses because
such bequests can significantly influence cost-benefit measures in
any given year—even if they are averaged in a three- or five-year
moving average. Of course, if there is a steady stream of large
bequests coming to fruition each year, there will not be much ampli-
tude in the gift cycle.
It should be clear that one wants to use changes in pledges
and expectancies so as to avoid double-counting the pledges and
expectancies. By focusing on changes rather than on the level of
pledges and expectancies, one nets out the movement from promises
to actual gifts. Furthermore, and perhaps most important, the Finan-
cial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has mandated that nonprofit
organizations show these on their books beginning with any fiscal
year after December 15, 1994. According to FASB, “organizations are
required to report as revenue in their financial statements all uncon-
ditional promises to give.” An “unconditional promise” is character-
ized as an “irretractable commitment” (CASE, 1996, pp. 75–76). It
should be noted that these regulations may change as FASB and the
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Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) try to reconcile
language differences but still account for pledges to universities and
university-related foundations.
Although not established in the original CASE/NACUBO guide-
lines (1990) as a protocol, there is some evidence (CASE, 1996;
Lindahl, 1994) that using changes in pledges and changes in bequest
expectancies may become the norm. Also, a group of university
financial officers (primarily from the Big Ten, Big Twelve, and Pac
Ten) have been meeting to try to develop a more meaningful stan-
dard. They have proposed illustrating the data both with and with-
out grant income and with and without changes in pledges and
changes in bequest expectancies. To facilitate the discussion, changes
in bequest expectancies are shown at both their present values and
face (future) values. (See Rooney, 1998, for a more complete discus-
sion and comparison of these results.)
Cost-Benefit Ratios by Type
of Fundraising Activity
Greenfield (1996) reports costs of fundraising averages for many dif-
ferent types of nonprofits and for many different types of fundraising.
His research synopsis is that “professional fund-raising executives sug-
gest that a mature fund development program should be able to
achieve a bottom-line cost-benefit ratio of $0.20 to $0.30 to raise
$1.00 after three years of operation” (p. xxx). However, the range is
much wider between types of fundraising activities. For example,
acquisition of new patrons by direct mail may cost as much as $1.25 to
$1.50 per dollar raised whereas getting the same patron to renew aver-
ages between $0.20 and $0.25 per dollar raised. According to Green-
field, fundraising costs for capital campaigns range between $0.10 and
$0.20, and foundations average $0.20, per dollar raised. Ideally, there
would be a separate cost-benefit analysis for each type of fundraising,
which would create the environment for more meaningful bench-
marking in each segment of a given development program.
The Campus Study
The data used in this article are the result of a multiyear attempt to
analyze the costs and benefits of fundraising efforts at a large, Mid-
western, urban, public, research university. The costs of fundraising
at this campus are supported by four main sources. First, the campus
is assessed a development services fee by the development office,
100 percent of which is applied to covering fundraising costs. Second,
the development office collects an investment management fee based
on relative shares of each school’s assets held by the development
office in various forms of investments. Part of this fee pays for
fundraising costs, and part of it pays for administrative and asset man-
agement costs. Third, the development office charges campus units a
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user fee for telemarketing services. Fourth, individual deans (or direc-
tors) may have their own development efforts, for which they fund
the direct and indirect expenses from resources within that unit.
Two of the goals of the campus study were to obtain the most
recent estimates for the costs and benefits of fundraising and to track
the historical data. This second goal was intended to measure
whether or not there were trends in the costs or benefits that needed
to be addressed or at least recognized. Another goal was to establish
benchmark data with which future results could be compared. Both
of these goals required gathering as much historical data as possible
and estimating those data that were necessary but no longer (if ever)
available directly. This study reports the data from a decade of
changes (1984 through 1994–95), with special emphasis on the
1994–95 fiscal year, which is the most recent year for which com-
plete data are available. To allow for better historical comparability,
all dollar figures are converted to real (inflation-adjusted) 1993 dol-
lars; that is, all dollars are expressed as if they were equal to the pur-
chasing power of a dollar in 1993.
Gift Data
The gift data are the best and most complete data available. The gift
data in Table 1 indicate some variability that is somewhat idiosyn-
cratic to school, campus, and university-wide capital campaigns.
(Note that the data for 1984–1990 are expressed in calendar years,
and the remainder are expressed in fiscal years. This is unavoidable
because the gift data are not available in a consistent format.)
Cost Data
Analyzing the costs of fundraising is more difficult for numerous rea-
sons. First, the development office did not have the systems to cap-
ture campus-specific data for all of its assessments for the entire
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Table 1. Private Gifts
Nominal $ Real 1993 $
Percentage Percentage
Year Millions Change Millions Change
1984 3.9 5.4
1985 6.7 72 9.0 66
1986 10.0 49 13.2 47
1987 8.9 12 11.3 15
1988 16.0 81 19.5 74
1989 9.6 10 11.2 43
1990 9.5 1 10.5 6
1991–92 10.0 5 10.6 1
1992–93 10.8 8 11.2 5
1993–94 12.3 14 12.3 10
1994–95 14.2 15 13.8 12
period. This made it necessary to estimate the investment manage-
ment fee for most of the years. Second, the development office did
not keep historical records of its distinct costs for development activ-
ities, administrative activities, and asset management activities prior
to the fiscal year 1990–91. Hence, these data do not extend back to
the entire period included in this study. Third, this study was com-
plicated by the fact that these records were not broken down by cam-
pus until the fiscal year 1994–95. Finally, given that the campus is
part of a large, multicampus, statewide system, it should be acknowl-
edged that costs paid by the campus to the university-wide develop-
ment office are not necessarily equal to the fundraising-related
expenditures made by the development office on the campus’s behalf.
However, it is reasonable and simplifying to assume that those costs
do equal the development office’s expenditures on the campus’s
behalf, and this article uses that assumption.
Fundraising, Asset Management,
and Administration Costs
To simplify the presentation, cost estimates are disaggregated into the
following: fees and assessments related to fundraising paid to
the development office; fees and assessments not directly related
to fundraising (for example, asset management and administration
of the endowment) but paid to the development office; and develop-
ment expenditures made by the academic units (see Table 2). The
first column lists the total user fees and campuswide assessments
paid by the campus to the development office directly for fundrais-
ing activities. The second column lists the fees and assessments paid
by the campus to the development office for asset management and
administrative expenditures such as endowment administration. The
third column is the sum of the first two columns. The fourth column
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Table 2. Expenditures for Fundraising and Asset 
Management/Administration in Nominal Dollars
Development Development
Office’s Fees Office’s Fees Development Development
and Assessments: and Assessments: Office’s Fees Expenditures
Fundraising Nonfundraising and Assessments: by Campus
Year Subtotal Subtotal Total Units
1984–85 1,198,847 1,198,847 35,125
1985–86 1,328,265 1,328,265 62,400
1986–87 1,424,659 1,424,659 259,402
1987–88 1,813,130 1,813,130 461,960
1988–89 2,422,106 2,422,106 623,783
1989–90 1,849,729 827,241 2,676,969 965,631
1990–91 1,931,969 697,977 2,629,946 1,170,900
1991–92 1,848,278 776,127 2,624,405 1,305,208
1992–93 1,938,463 847,444 2,785,907 2,493,658
1993–94 2,037,739 1,057,718 3,095,457 2,708,337
is based on actual expenditures for most units and a conservative
estimate (as discussed earlier) for the remaining units.
Although campus units were not very active with respect to cam-
pus development activities for the first several years in this study,
activities increased quite dramatically during the late 1980s and early
1990s. For example, unit expenditures for development more than
quadrupled from 1985–86 to 1986–87 and almost doubled from
1986–87 to 1987–88. Campus units’ development expenditures dou-
bled again within two years. Even following such rapid growth in the
1980s, school, or unit-level, development expenditures nearly tripled
by the mid-1990s. Given that it is a newer campus and a public,
research university facing declining state support (when adjusted for
inflation and enrollments), it is not surprising that the academic units
have increased their individual investments in fundraising. (See
Grunig, 1995, for a discussion of the payoffs to decentralized versus
centralized development programs.)
Results
Table 3 shows the traditional measures of fundraising efficiency: rev-
enues raised per dollar spent and amount spent per dollar raised.
This table gives the historical data about the opportunity costs of
fundraising that are relevant to campus decision makers. It should
be noted that there are two complete sets of calculations in this table.
One set (the third and fourth columns) looks at the efficiency
measures with respect to fundraising expenditures alone. This is
comparable to the data used in CASE/NACUBO, except that it does
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Table 3. Costs Versus Benefits of Fundraising
Total
Fundraising Total Costs Total Costs Gross
Costs Rev’s. (Includes (Includes Rev’s. Gross
(Excludes Total per $ Amount admin. and admin. and per $ Amount
40–47.5% of Fundraising Spent Spent gross mgmt. gross mgmt. Spent Spent
mgmt. fees) Costs Real per $ fees) fees) Real per $
Year Nominal $ Real 1993 $ 1993 $ Raised Nominal $ Real 1993 $ 1993 $ Raised
1984–85 1,233,972 1,716,159 3.2 0.32 1,233,972 1,716,159 3.2 0.32
1985–86 1,390,665 1,867,575 4.8 0.21 1,390,665 1,867,575 4.8 0.21
1986–87 1,684,061 2,220,317 5.9 0.17 1,684,061 2,220,317 5.9 0.17
1987–88 2,275,090 2,893,930 3.9 0.26 2,275,090 2,893,930 3.9 0.26
1988–89 3,045,889 3,720,465 5.3 0.19 3,045,889 3,720,465 5.3 0.19
1989–90 2,815,360 3,280,802 3.4 0.29 3,642,601 4,244,805 2.6 0.38
1990–91 3,102,868 3,430,486 3.1 0.33 3,800,845 4,202,159 2.5 0.40
1991–92 3,153,486 3,345,659 3.2 0.32 3,929,613 4,169,083 2.5 0.39
1992–93 4,432,121 4,564,801 2.4 0.41 5,279,565 5,437,614 2.1 0.49
1993–94 4,746,076 4,746,076 2.6 0.39 5,803,794 5,803,794 2.1 0.47
1994–95 4,905,490 4,776,572 2.9 0.35 5,975,256 5,818,225 2.4 0.42
Even following
such rapid
growth in the
1980s, school, or
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development
expenditures
nearly tripled by
the mid-1990s
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not include the private (nongovernmental) grants that CASE/
NACUBO include. The second set of efficiency measures are in the
seventh and eighth columns and refer to the “full costs” associated
with fundraising. Full costs are the traditional costs of fundraising
per-ask plus administrative and asset management costs of operat-
ing a development office. Recall that there would not be significant
administrative and asset management costs in a development pro-
gram if there were not fundraising costs and efforts. As discussed
earlier, there may be additional or better measurements that might
assess the asset management and endowment administration costs
against the value of the endowment or the value of private gifts.
As noted earlier, although this analysis captures many more
of the actual costs than prior analyses, the reference to “full costs”
in the results section of this article is somewhat misleading as the
analysis does not include any campus fees for space utilization,
depreciation, maintenance, utilities, and so on, for the development
offices that are distributed across the campus. However, it does cap-
ture these costs for the main development offices. Likewise, per
CASE/NACUBO (1990), it also excludes the pro rata share of the
time of the university president, campus chancellor, and deans.
While this is consistent with other analyses, it significantly under-
states the true costs. Gathering these data would require a great deal
of time on the part of the offices of the president, the chancellor, and
each of the deans. (If using these data became the norm, then these
offices would establish systems to capture the data; however, to do
so exclusively for this analysis would have been burdensome.) Also,
as already stated, it does not include the costs for alumni relations,
public relations, and so on, some or all of which might be viewed
as expenditures in support of development or which might be areas
into which development expenditures are shifted.
The results as shown in Table 3 indicate that including the
administrative and asset management costs (at least those that can
be tracked) increased the total costs of raising a dollar from $0.35
to $0.42 in 1994–95, a 20 percent increase. Similarly, including
administrative and asset management costs raises the three-year
average cost of fundraising from $0.38 to $0.46 for each dollar raised
(a 21 percent increase). Obviously, these ratios would increase if
there were additions for the pro rata time of the university president,
campus chancellor, and deans; for the opportunity cost of the space,
utilities, and so on; or for the alumni relations, public relations, or
other costs “in support of development.” However, these ratios give
us an indication of the order of magnitude by which the currently
accepted standards promulgated by CASE/NACUBO misrepresent
the true costs of operating a development program.
Table 4 includes the private grants that the Council for the Aid
to Education (CAE) uses in its reports. These data are shown to
allow comparability to the CAE data and to illustrate how fallacious
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this measurement is. For example, the 1994–95 data excluding
grants indicates that $0.35 was spent per dollar raised (see Table 3).
(It averaged $0.38 for the past three years.) On the other hand,
incorporating the nongovernmental grants lowers this ratio to $0.09
(or an average of $0.10 for the past three years). Excluding the pri-
vate grants raises the estimated cost of fundraising virtually by a fac-
tor of four but provides a much more meaningful insight into actual
development costs and benefits.
The data in Table 4 are the most comparable to other nationally
reported data. These results suggest that when one includes the sig-
nificant private grant support and excludes the “full costs,” the cost
of fundraising at this campus is quite reasonable relative to other
programs. For example, the fifty-one programs participating in the
CASE/NACUBO (1990) study from colleges and universities across
the nation reported a median cost of development of $0.11 per dol-
lar raised. The range for the middle 50 percent of participating insti-
tutions was $0.08 to $0.16. Similarly, Richard Ramsden (1979)
reports an average of $0.07 for fourteen private universities and
$0.10 for eleven private colleges. These institutions were all part of
the Consortium on Financing Higher Education (COFHE). This
places the cost of fundraising at this campus just at the national aver-
age in the CASE/NACUBO study (1990) and 29 percent above the
average of the fourteen private universities in the Ramsden (1979)
study. However, we would expect that the fundraising costs at a
large, public, research university located in an urban setting would
be greater than that of a group of selective private universities.
A New Methodology
Table 5 replicates Tables 3 and 4, but it also includes estimates for
changes in pledges and changes in bequest expectancies. Table 5
reports data only for 1994–95; the development office did not main-
tain records for changes in pledges or changes in bequest expectan-
cies broken down by campus in previous years. Like the preceding
tables, Table 5 includes analyses of costs and benefits that examine
fundraising costs alone (the third and fourth columns) and those
that include administrative and asset management fees (the sixth and
seventh columns). As already mentioned, the cost of fundraising
(alone) per dollar of gift income at the campus in 1994–95 was
$0.35. Adding the changes in pledges and changes in bequest
expectancies at present value lowers the cost per dollar of
gift income to $0.27, or $0.22 if one uses the face value estimate.
Finally, including the private (nongovernmental) grants and changes
in pledges and in the present value of bequest expectancies lowers
the ratio further to $0.09 expended per dollar raised.
If one includes the asset management and administrative
expenses of the development office, the ratio of costs per dollar
raised is $0.42 for 1994–95, using our most simple measure (private
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gifts only). Adding changes in pledges and in the present value of
bequest expectancies drops the cost-benefit ratio to $0.33, and using
the face value of changes in bequest expectancies lowers it further to
$0.26. Adding private grants to changes in pledges and in the present
value of bequest expectancies drops the cost-benefit ratio to $0.10.
The group of university financial officers decided to report the
changes in bequest expectancies at both the face value (what econo-
mists would call the “future value”) and at the (discounted) present
value. As can be seen in Table 5, such differences can be large. The
face value of changes in bequest expectancies is $7.3 million, whereas
the present value is $2.8 million. The difference stems from the fact
that the face value shows how much the bequest is for at some future
date. However, recognizing that a dollar is worth more today than in
the future, the present value shows how much one would be willing
to receive today to be just as well off as the face value at some speci-
fied point in the future. (Per CASE, 1994, the discount rate is
the applicable federal rate, which approximates 120 percent of
the thirty-year Treasury note.) From an economic perspective, clearly
it is much more accurate to value the bequest expectancies using
a discounted present valuation. (Note that bequests are not recog-
nized on the books until they come in because donors can change
their wills.)
Implications
Per Steinberg (1994), efficiency considerations require that internal
decisions be made on the basis of continuing to invest in fundrais-
ing up to the point that the marginal costs are equal to the marginal
benefits. Ideally, this would be done in the manner recommended by
Greenfield (1996) such that the investment in each of the various
fundraising strategies would continue up to the point at which the
marginal costs of each approach equaled the marginal benefits
derived from that approach. Nonetheless, practitioners can expect
that external boards, donors, and other constituencies will continue
to place significant emphasis on average costs and average benefits
in the form of cost-benefit analyses. It is inevitable that even when
boards understand the maximizing concepts, they will still want the
organization to demonstrate that it is among the “best” in its field by
maintaining a relatively low cost-benefit ratio. More important, even
if boards and other constituencies understand and endorse the move
to a marginal analysis, they will still make inferior decisions if they
are given inferior data.
This article has focused on the methodological changes neces-
sary to improve both internal decision-making and external bench-
marking and accountability practices. The erroneous inclusion of all
private (nongovernmental) grants affects both the marginal analysis
(by overstating the marginal benefits) and the cost-benefit analy-
sis (by exaggerating the total benefits). Similarly, the exclusion of
54 RO O N E Y
From an
economic
perspective,
clearly it is much
more accurate to
value the bequest
expectancies
using a
discounted
present valuation
several significant costs of fundraising (such as the pro rata share of
the time of the president and other senior academic officers, costs
associated with space utilization, and other costs that are in support
of fundraising) understates the true marginal cost of fundraising, as
well as the true average cost. In addition, this article recommends
including the changes in pledges and changes in bequest expectan-
cies to more accurately correlate the time periods of effort and dol-
lars invested in fundraising with the realization of the returns on that
investment. This change would affect both the marginal benefits of
fundraising and the average benefits.
The bottom line for practitioners is that nobody wants to be the
first (or the only) one to be honest about the true costs and benefits
of fundraising because the public has been misled for so long. The
public has been convinced that in many organizations, it only takes
a few cents (a dime is commonly reported) to raise a dollar. Hence,
the belief that it should only take a few cents to raise a dollar
becomes normative. The first practitioners to reveal a reality that dif-
fers from this fantasy may be fired (thus the Greenfield quotation at
the beginning of the article).
It would be far better for organizations that rely on fundraising
to embrace these changes more broadly and collaboratively as indus-
try-wide best practices and report the corresponding benchmark data.
Rob Paton (forthcoming) discusses some of the positive and negative
experiences that a group of charitable organizations in the United
Kingdom have had in sharing these types of data over the past
decade. It will require considerable effort to educate boards and other
constituencies, but doing so will place the discussion in a more man-
ageable context. As opposed to the status quo, in which the industry
norms lead to very biased, inconsistent, and misleading results,
implementation of these changes on an industry-wide basis will yield
better internal decision making and external accountability without
unnecessarily threatening the jobs of the senior management teams.
PATRICK MICHAEL ROONEY is special assistant to the chancellor, associate
professor of economics, and adjunct associate professor of philanthropic
studies at Indiana University Purdue University (IUPU)–Indianapolis,
and assistant dean at IUPU–Columbus.
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